Victors In The Old Game Of Agriculture And Trade

Several theories have been put forth to explain the Great Divergence, ranging from access to high levels of coal deposits and trade with the Americas to the open science movement in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on the back of the Gutenberg press which led to the scientific revolution in Europe.16 Industrial technology built upon the invention of the steam engine, combined with access to coal deposits as fuel, caused the productivity of the industrial nations to skyrocket. Leveraging the industrial technology, the factories in Britain would also scale up much more. The ‘virtuous cycle’ of industrialization and colonialization worked beautifully, and the results were there for all to see. Colonialization and then industrialization paved the way for an astonishing reversal of fortunes, creating a whole new set of economic winners and losers on the world stage. In that process, it tilted the balance of power as well. As power, wealth and influence shifted from Eurasia to Western Europe, nations such as England and France became the dominant powers. The fulcrum of the world moved from the East to the West, from Eurasia to Western Europe and from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean. The new European colonial powers, when they entered the Indian Ocean, would find a bustling if decentralized trade system extending from the Red Sea to the Spice Islands. The Western European colonial powers, however, were coming to the Indian Ocean game, having learnt from the Mediterranean Sea–faring powers. The Portuguese and the Dutch were seeking monopoly of the trade routes, and would not hesitate to use military force to achieve it. The incumbents, on the other hand, did not anticipate this monopolistic, militaristic quest.

We All Stand Together

After all, even though certain trade points were controlled by larger empires such as the Ottomans, the Indian Ocean trade was not actually militarized or monopolized. In the early exploratory days of colonialism, the Asian empires were, in fact, at the peak of their strength and influence. If the Egyptians, Ottomans, Indians or Chinese had recognized that the colonial powers’ success would lay the foundation for the economic and political system for the next 500 years, they could also have been active participants and leaders and shapers of those systems, instead of being on the receiving end and watching from the sidelines. But these incumbent powers, victors in the old game of agriculture and trade, did not realize that a new Great Game was underway, nor did they attempt to become active colonists themselves. In history, Indian, Chinese and Egyptian empires had extended beyond their immediate boundaries and shores, so it was not that there was no precedent. But as Adam Smith pointed out, the policies of Egypt, India and China continued to favour and emphasize agriculture over all other avenues. In continuing to focus on agriculture and regional trade, they ended up focusing on the wrong game, a typical folly of an established incumbent. Not surprisingly, the balance of power tilted heavily towards the new colonial powers. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, their monopoly was beginning to be threatened by the emergence of the Dutch and English under the auspices of their respective East India Companies. By 1700, the Dutch and English East India Companies would come to dominate the trade between Europe and Asia, edging out the Spanish and the Portuguese, who eventually shifted their focus on the Americas instead. For example, the Dutch gained much of their knowledge about the oceans by espionage. In addition, these rivalries actually deepened the urge for colonialism and imperialism.

Someday Soon

Even countries like Germany, where at first Otto von Bismarck did not view colonies as important, ultimately would enter the ranks of imperialist powers due to domestic pressures. The trading corporations would also stitch together alliances with those who had a vested interest in continued imperialist expansion for any reason. The British East India Company, for example, initially started off as a monopolistic trading corporation. At one point, the East India Company commanded a private army of 260,000 soldiers, twice the size of the standing British army of that time. But as the company started assuming political control of provinces such as Bengal in India through military action, the British government intervened. Despite intense rivalries, Britain would emerge as the leading colonial and industrial power. English became the lingua franca of the world, granting English speakers a competitive advantage that continues to this day. The British empire came to control the trade routes of the world, the communication networks, the political and economic destinies of nations, and, of course, the wealth of the world. What might have started as a haphazard accumulation of possessions suddenly was starting to fit into a broader pattern and force. This new force, the New Imperialism, described as ‘an expansionist, sensational concept of Empire’, would make the British feel that ‘they were riding a wave of destiny’. The British built the most extensive trade and communications infrastructure the world had ever known. Like in previous eras, continued control and protection of this infrastructure, especially in light of increasing competition between the colonial powers as well as from domestic rulers, led to heightened geopolitical activity.

Why Oh Why?

The British had invented submarine cables and depended on them for military and political intelligence and centralized control. With the electric telegraph cables being laid globally in the nineteenth century, the whole empire was suddenly accessible and connected, and much easier to control. As Morris concludes, ‘All this vast expertise, of ships and mails and cable stations, had made the British prime masters of international movement.’ With such monopolistic control of such a vast imperial trade and communications infrastructure, the British empire was truly a global one. As the system of nation states emerged in Europe, competition, not cooperation, became the dominant dynamic. The rivalries over colonies in Asia and Africa, and control of trade networks, drove this competition into what can be described as an ‘age of frenzied nationalism and imperialist expansion’. The two world wars were ultimately also the outcome of the forces and rivalries unleashed by industrialization and colonialism. Whatever the reasons might have been for the final sparking of the Great War, later called World War I, it was probably one of the most significant geopolitical consequences of the economic and social restructuring and rivalries driven by the Industrial Revolution and European colonialism.